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CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PERSONS
MISSOURI DOCTRINE AS TO CONTRACTS FOR THE
BENEFIT OF THIRD PERSONS
From the middle of the nineteenth century the Missouri
courts have, with a few exceptions, recognized the right of a
third party to sue upon a contract made for his benefit. The
occasional cases holding to the contrary during the gradual
development of judicial recognition of this right have been
unequivocally overruled. The position thus taken by the Mis-
souri courts has been in accord with the prevailing weight of
American authority, which holds that the person for whose
benefit a contract is made may enforce the promise, even
though he is a stranger both to the contract and the considera-
tion. The promise need not be made to the third party bene-
ficiary in form, but it must be made to him in fact, to give
him the right to sue upon it; that is, it is essential that the
third person be the one whom the contractors intended to
benefit. The purpose of this article is to present a brief
resume of the leading Missouri cases on this subject.
Two of the earliest cases are, The Bank of Missouri v.
Benoist, 10 Mo., 519, and Robbins v. Ayres, 10 Mo., 538, both
decided in 1847. In the Bank of Missouri v. Benoist the court
expressly affirmed the doctrine that the third party beneficiary
of a simple contract may maintain an action upon it. In Rob-
bins v. Ayres it was held that in the case of sealed instruments
the third party beneficiary must sue in the name of the prom-
isee. The court went on to say that in the case of simple con-
tracts the promise need not be in writing in order that the
third person may maintain an action upon it in his own name.
The case of Rogers & Peak v. Gosnell, 51 Mo., 466 (1873)
involved a sealed instrument executed between the vendors
of a plot of land, and the defendant, who agreed to purchase
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same. In this instrument was a promise on the part of the
defendant to pay a debt of the vendors to the plaintiffs, who,
were their creditors. The court held that the party in whose
name a contract is made for the benefit of another, is a trustee
of an express trust, and may sue in his own name. (Harney
v. Dutcher, 15 Mo., 89; Miles v. Davis, 19 Mo., 408). But it
further held that the fact that the trustee may sue in his own
name does not preclude the beneficiary from suing in his name,
although a prior recovery by the trustee would bar another
action by the beneficiary, who would, in such case, have his
remedy against the trustee. Two things were established by
this decision: first, that a third party beneficiary may sue in
his own name when it appears on the face of the contract that
he is the party to be benefited; second, that this proposition
is not restricted to simple contracts, but applies as well to
contracts under seal. In 1875 this case was again before the
Supreme Court (58 Mo. 589') when it was held that the law
presumes that when a promise is made for the benefit of a
third person he accepts it-to overthrow this presumption a
dissent must be shown. The principle was thus established
that a third party beneficiary acquires a right immediately
upon the formation of the contract, and that any subsequent
revocation is ineffectual.
The case of Heim v. Vogel, 69 Mo., 529, holds that when a
grantee accepts a deed poll containing a statement that the
land conveyed is subject to a mortgage, which the grantee
assumes and agrees to pay, a promise by the grantee for the
benefit of the mortgagee is implied therefrom, and the mort-
gagee may sue the grantee. This doctrine is affirmd in Crone
v. Stinde. 156 Mo., 262 (1900) which further holds that a third
party beneficiary may enforce a contract if he adopts it after
it is made, even though he is not named in the contract, or
may not have known of it at the time. At present, a mortgagee
may sue a grantee who has promised the mortgagor to pay the
mortgage, in the U. S. Supreme Court, and in every state court
except that of Massachusetts.
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In Utley v. Tolfree, 77 Mo., 307 (1883) bankers received
money from a customer on an express promise to pay it to the
plaintiff, who recovered in this case. It was held to be no
defense that the money was deposited in the customer's name
with his consent, or that he at the time promised to make a
further deposit to cover his own indebtedness to the bank and
failed to do so.
An interesting question arises as to the liability of tele-
graph companies to the addressees of messages which they
have contracted to deliver in case they are negligent in so
doing. In the case of Markel v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 19 Mo. A., 80 (1885) it was held that the addressee could
recover from the telegraph company for its negligence in trans-
mitting and delivering a message. In its decision the court
went on to say that the third party beneficiary could not
maintain an action, however, unless the benefit to the plaintiff
was the cause of making the contract, and not merely inci-
dental to carrying it out.
In Harvey Lumber Co. v. H. & C. Lumber Co., 39 Mo. A.,
214 (1890) it was held that where one party agrees for a suffi-
cient consideration to pay the debts of another, the creditors
of the latter may sue the promisor.
In the case of the City of St. Louis to Use v. Von Phul, 133
Mo., 561 (1896) the defendant had entered into a contract with
the city to repair certain streets, giving a bond conditioned on
the payment of all sums due for labor or material furnished
for such repairs. The plaintiff, a cement company, sued the
defendant on this bond for failure to pay for materials which
they had furnished him for use in carrying out his contract
for the repair of the streets. The plaintiff recovered in this
case, since the city is under a positive obligation to keep its
streets in good condition, and since it was the plain intent of
the contracting parties, in the giving of this bond, to benefit
a certain class of persons, of whom the plaintiff was one. This
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is regarded as a leading case on this phase of contract law,
and expressly overruled Kansas City Sewer Pipe Co. v.
Thompson, 120 Mo. 218. School District v. Livers, 147 Mo.,
580, is in accord with this case, the court holding that workmen
and materialmen may recover from a surety for the promise
of a contractor to a district or municipality to pay for his
labor and materials. Buffalo Forge Co. v. Cullen & Stock
Mfg. Co., 105 Mo. A., 484 (1904) expressly decides under facts
very similar to those in City. of St. Louis v. Von Phul, that
the laborers and materialmen shall be presumed to be the
parties intended to be benefited, and hence may sue upon such
a contractor's bond.
Where a contract is entered into by two parties for the
benefit of a third party, such third party can maintain an ac-
tion on the contract even though he is not named therein, pro-
vided that his interest is not merely that of indemnity. (Bank
v. Commission Co., 139 Mo. A., 110.)
In the case of Van Meter v. Poole, 119 Mo. A., 296 (1906)
it was held that a third person may sue on a contract entered
into with a principal debtor, binding the defendant to pay a
debt for which the plaintiff is liable as surety, since this is an
agreement to pay the surety's debt, and as such is for his
benefit.
In Scheele v. Lafayette Bank, 120 Mo. A., 611 (1906) the
insured, for the purpose of securing notes held by the defend-
ant bank, contracted to assign an insurance policy to the bank,
both for its benefit, and for the benefit of the plaintiff, his
daughter. A new policy was thereupon issued which provided
that 5/6ths of the value thereof should be paid to the bank,
and that the other 1/6th should be paid to the plaintiff; the
bank agreeing to advance and pay all premiums subsequently
accruing on the policy. The court held that the benefit to be
derived by the plaintiff from the bank's agreement to pay the
premiums was substantial, and not merely incidental, and
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that therefore the plaintiff was entitled to sue the bank for
breach of this agreement.
Howsmon v. Trenton Water Co., 119 Mo., 304 (1893) is one
of the most important Missouri cases on this subject, for that
case decides that a water company, which agrees with a town
to be liable for damages caused by its failure to supply water
sufficient to extinguish all fires, cannot be sued on such an
agreement by a citizen, even though he and others pay a spe-
cial tax to the company under the contract. This decision is
based on the ground that the benefit to be conferred upon an
individual citizen by the contract is incidental to the contract,
the primary object being to benefit all the citizens in their
corporate capacity, and to protect the municipality.
In O'Connell v. Trust Co., 165 Mo. A., 398 (1912) it was
held that an agreement made by a vendor of land with the
vendee, whereby the former deposited with a third party an
amount of money to protect the vendee against judgments
which were a lien against the land, was not an agreement for
the benefit of the holders of the judgments.
It is sufficient in order that the third party beneficiary may
sue, that the promisee owe to him some obligation or duty,
legal or equitable, which would give him a just claim. (Lime
& Cement Co. v. Wind, 86 Mo. A., 163.)
In the case of Lumber Co. v. Niedermeyer, 187 Mo. A., 180
(1915) the plaintiff, a lumber dealer, having knowledge of a
contract between the defendant and "T" (by which the de-
fendant agreed that if 'T" would give a deed of trust on some
lots on which he desired to erect two houses, he, the defendant,
would obtain money thereon to pay, and would pay the bills
of the plaintiff for the lumber used in said houses), sold the
lumber for these houses to "T". "T" executed the deeds of
trust, and the defendant obtained more than enough money
to pay the said bills, but refused to do so. Plaintiff recovered.
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In Duerre v. Ruediger, 65 Mo. A., 407 (1895) it was held
that a promise is not within the Statute of Frauds simply be-
caues it is for the benefit of a third party who may sue upon it.
Fraternal benefit societies have caused some difficulty in
this matter. While the beneficiary of a life insurance policy
acquires a vested right of which he cannot be deprived and
upon which he may maintain an action against the insurance
company, yet the person named as beneficiary in the certifi-
cate of a fraternal benefit association acquires not a vested
right, but a mere expectancy which it is within the power of
the insured member to defeaf at any time. (Masonic Benev-
olent Asociation v. Bunch, 109 Mo., 560).
In Ellis v. Harrison, 104 Mo., 270, it was held that a cred-
itor may sue an individual or firm upon his or its promise to
an outgoing partner to pay his liabilities.
Atkinson v. Hardy, 128 Mo. A., 349, decided that where the
plaintiff's parents executed a note, secured by deed of trust
on their homestead, to plaintiff's grandfather, who, on the
death of the plaintiff's father agreed that if their mother
would convey to the plaintiffs their interest in the land, he
would transfer the note to the plaintiffs, and the mother did
so convey the land to the plaintiffs, they were entitled to en-
force the contract against the grandfather or his representa-
tive.
Another interesting question is as to the right.of the con-
tracting parties to rescind the contract before the beneficiary
has assented thereto. There are two opposing views on this
question. One is, that there is no privity between the promisor
and the beneficiary until the latter assents to the contract,
and that consequently until he does so, the contracting parties
may rescind or change it as they see fit. The other view, and
this is the theory which the Missouri courts follow, is that
since the law, operating upon the acts of the contracting par-
ties, creates the necessary privity between the promisor and
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the beneficiary immediately upon the consummation of the
contract, it follows that the contracting parties can not there-
after rescind the contract without the third person's consent:
The promisor may, as defense, set up the invalidity of the
debt he promised to pay. Thus, in Gate City Bank v. Chick,
170 Mo. A., 343, it was held that one who assumed all the
grantor's debts, in return for an assignment of property, could
dispute the validity of any debt so assumed.
Difficulties arise when the rights of the promisee are con-
sidered. It would be manifestly unjust to subject the promisor
to two actions for the same breach. Yet should not the prom-
isee be allowed to maintain an action for breach of a contract
to which he is one of the principal parties, even though not
the party to be benefited? The courts have surmounted this
obstacle, however, by holding that a recovery by either party
(i. e. either the promisee or the beneficiary) is a bar to an ac-
tion by the other. (Snider v. Adams Express Co., 77 Mo., 523;
American Nat'l. Bank v. Klock, 53 Mo. A., 335; Gunnell v.
Emerson, 73 Mo. A., 291.)
In the case of a creditor-beneficiary it was held in Leckie
v. Bennet, 160 Mo. A., 145, that such a beneficiary had a right
against both the original debtor and the new promisor, a re-
covery being permitted against both. Defenses that would be
good against the promisee, however, are good against the
creditor.
The action by the third party cannot be maintained merely
because he will be incidentally benefited by performance of
the contract; he must be a party to the consideration, or the
contract must have been entered into for his benefit, and he
must have some legal or equitable interest in its performance.
In all cases, the contract must be a valid contract between the
contracting parties, and the third party takes subject to all
inherent equities affecting the principal parties.
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At first thought it seems that this allowance of an action
by a third party beneficiary is a violation of the rule that con-
sideration must always move from the promisee. Yet in these
cases the third party is not the promisee, and hence is not
required to furnish the consideration.
From the foregoing cases, it will be seen that the courts of
Missouri construe contracts involving a benefit to a third per-
son with the utmost liberality, and inquire only as to the in-
tention of the parties. If it was their intention, or rather
their reason for entering into the contract, that a third party
should be benefited, then that third party may sue, whether
he be a sole, donee, creditor, or mortgagee beneficiary.
PAUL A. RICHARDS '23.
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